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Abstract 
This paper examines why the history wars between South Korea and Japan are intensifying 
in the 21
st
 century and the prospects for reconciliation. South Korea’s history museums 
promote anti-Japanese nationalism, making it difficult to unshackle the present from the 
past. In 2014 there was controversy over a Japanese manga exhibit that resonates with 
broader bilateral disputes over colonial history ranging from the comfort women to forced 
labor. These battles over the shared past have become internationalized, stoking mutual 
vilification and jingoistic sentiments. 
Keywords: South Korea, Japan, museums, manga, comfort women, reconciliation 
Izvleček 
Ta članek preučuje, zakaj se spori o zgodovini vojn med Južno Korejo in Japonsko 
stopnjujejo v 21. stoletju, in tudi možnosti za spravo. Južnokorejski zgodovinski muzeji 
spodbujajo anti-japonski nacionalizem, zaradi česar je težko osvoboditi sedanjost 
preteklosti. Leta 2014 se je pojavila polemika o razstavi japonskih mang, ki je odmevala s 
širšimi dvostranskimi spori o kolonialni zgodovini, ki segajo od žensk za tolažbo do 
prisilnega dela. Te bitke za skupno preteklost so postale mednarodne, opremljene z 
medsebojnim obrekovanjem in šovinističnimi čustvi. 
Ključne besede: Južna Koreja, Japonska, muzeji, manga, ženske za tolažbo, sprava 
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Introduction 
The War Memorial of Korea is a sprawling complex in Seoul, South Korea where 
those who died in the fratricidal Korean War (1950–53) are honored. One 
approaches the main building across a massive plaza with a towering, carved 
obelisk in the center surrounded by statues and bas-reliefs of soldiers and refugees, 
a gripping statue of reunion between two brothers divided by the conflict (the 
South Korean soldier towering over his frailer North Korean kin), tributes to the 
sixteen countries that dispatched troops under United Nations auspices and an 
outdoor exhibit of military planes, tanks and ships just to the right of the main 
building. The War Memorial has become a contested battleground in South 
Korea’s intramural history wars, conveying an official narrative glorifying and 
validating the martial past in ways that are subverted by new memories and fresh 
remembering that have emerged with the end of military rule and rise of 
democratization. (Choe 2007) The nation’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
launched in 2005 has excavated some of the hastily buried, awkward history that 
exposes the South Korean (and U.S.) military’s indiscriminate killing of civilians 
wrongly suspected of being communist sympathizers. (Morris-Suzuki 2009) 
Unsurprisingly, the findings of this investigation have not yet been integrated into 
the War Memorial’s more triumphal narrative.  
There is a stone tablet at the entrance of the War Memorial plaza proclaiming, 
“Freedom is Not Free”. The irony became apparent just three days before a special 
exhibit at the War Memorial was to open on the premises on July 12, 2014, with 
newspaper headlines announcing that the One Piece manga/anime show from 
Japan was cancelled. Why? Because in this Japanese manga/anime series featuring 
the adventures of pirates and other outlaws searching for treasure there are some 
sketchy depictions of the Rising Sun flag––a red center with lines representing sun 
rays extending outward––that Koreans associate with Japanese militarism and the 
painful experiences of Japan’s colonial rule 1910–45. According to Tsukuba 
University’s Ōsawa Hirotaka there are very few scenes in the manga in which this 
Rising Sun flag is displayed and more importantly, it is the flag of the protagonists’ 
enemy and therefore not glorified. 
1
  
In contrast, the same show staged simultaneously during the summer of 2014 
was a huge hit in Taiwan (also a former Japanese colony 1895–1945) attracting 
                                                 
1 Interview August 2014. 
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100,000 visitors in the first week alone. The promotional campaign emblazoned 
the Taipei metro in One Piece cartoons, something unthinkable in Seoul’s subway 
given the prevailing sensitivities about the two nations shared history. After all, it 
wasn’t until 1998 that South Korea began to incrementally ease the blanket ban on 
Japanese cultural products that was imposed following independence in 1945. 
(Trends in Japan 2014) In fact, satellite broadcasts and the Internet had facilitated 
considerable cultural seepage before then, and Korean translations of Japanese 
manga were widely available and extremely popular, a grassroots rejection of state 
policy that helped propel the state-sanctioned cultural opening.  
 
Fig. 1: Enemy vessel with Rising Sun-esque flag approaching the pirate’s ship.2 
There is no denying the popularity of Japanese popular culture among young 
Koreans who are avid fans of manga and anime and disinclined to see them 
through the prism of historical animosities or state promoted narratives of 
victimization because that is not what they are about. This hasn’t prevented the 
ROK government, however, from deploying popular culture in a global battle to 
win hearts-and-minds. In January 2014, soon after Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s 
controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo on December 26, 2013 that 
serves as ground zero for an unrepentant, glorifying view of Japanese imperialism, 
the South Korean government requested that the annual Angoulême International 
Comics Festival in southwestern France exhibit Korean manhwa (cartoons) about 
comfort women, the euphemism for women forced into sexual slavery between 
1932–45 to provide sex for Japanese soldiers. Most were teenage Korean girls. 
                                                 
2 All photos are courtesy of author. 
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(Soh 2008)
3
 Among Koreans, Abe is associated with revisionist history that 
downplays, justifies, valorizes and shifts blame for Japanese imperialism. In his 
first stint as premier, Abe drew ire in 2007 when he quibbled about the level of 
coercion used to recruit Koreans to serve as comfort women on March 1
st
, the day 
when South Koreans remember their anti-Japanese uprising in 1919 and celebrate 
Independence Declaration Day. The Angoulême organizers turned down a request 
by the Japanese government to exhibit a Japanese manga about comfort women 
that supports claims that comfort women were not forcibly recruited by the 
Japanese military. (ANN 2014) Although this graphic riposte was not displayed, 
organizers allowed Japanese Embassy staff to pass out pamphlets explaining what 
the government has done to address the comfort women issue. Strange as it may 
seem, the realm of cartoons and pop culture is another fiercely contested 
battleground in the history wars.  
Returning to our discussion of One Piece manga, in the seventy-four volumes 
published between 1997–2013, there are hardly any Rising Sun-esque images and 
they are not prominently displayed. This is also the case for the 665 thirty-minute 
anime episodes, 12 movies and about thirty console video games as of 2014. 
While One Piece features a lot of violence, meaning the War Memorial site seems 
an appropriate venue, it has evolved into more than a simple story of pirates’ 
adventures, drawing on Greek and Roman mythology, historical events and 
contemporary global culture. Some of the themes such as racism, slavery, eugenics, 
war, justice, social hierarchies and war profiteering speak indirectly to the colonial 
experience, but there is nothing that specifically relates to Korea’s subjugation, 
and One Piece does not stoke patriotic or nationalist sentiments. It is, however, 
wildly popular, amassing the highest total manga sales ever in Japan, selling 
adventure fantasy that pulls in huge crowds, some 800,000 visitors to a 2014 
exhibit similar to the ones staged in Taipei and Seoul. Interestingly, the manga is a 
best-seller in South Korea and hundreds of televised episodes of One Piece dubbed 
in Korean have been aired in South Korea since 2003 with uncut and edited 
versions appearing on different channels and until 2014, no controversy over its 
few scattered images of Rising Sun flags. 
                                                 
3  Soh complicates the issue of victimization and details the range of experiences in ways that 
undermine popular conceptions of the system by drawing attention to Korean complicity. She is also 
critical of contemporary advocacy groups that have used comfort women as political pawns.  
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Fig. 2: One Piece Manga episode with offending Rising Sun-esque motif 
Netizens in Korea, one of the most wired societies anywhere, have become 
guardians of public mores and the thought police of the 21
st
 century; some seem to 
have an obsession with the Rising Sun flag and pressured the War Memorial to 
cancel the One Piece show over the flag. The back-story of the One Piece saga is 
that recently there have been a number of cases where K-pop artists have been 
zinged online for displaying or wearing Rising Sun flag images. (K-pop 2013) 
Whether as a backdrop for a music video poster, or on designer hoodies and hats, 
the Rising Sun flag that conjures up images of Japanese imperialism and brutal 
subjugation among many Koreans seems to have become the East Asian swastika. 
In a move similar to how Western punk and metal bands tried to cultivate 
rebellious, transgressive personas by dabbling in Nazi or fascist imagery, use of 
the Rising Sun flag has become a merchandizing strategy guaranteed to irritate 
many Koreans and draw attention in a highly competitive field. Given how 
assiduously K-pop bands are marketed and the extent to which coordinators 
choreograph everything about their dance routines, appearances, clothing, diet and 
private lives, it is hard to imagine that such displays were unwitting. But the 
Rising Sun flag is good copy and, after the attention grabbing ritual apology, the 
show goes on, hopefully accompanied by rising sales.  
Although there were no Rising Sun flag images among the many items in the 
proposed show, and advance ticket sales had been brisk, War Memorial 
management abruptly decided to cancel the show at the last minute. Organizers, 
however, took the case to court and won speedy justice, the judge ruling on July 
17, 2014 that the government-run facility was contractually obligated to host the 
exhibit since it had agreed to rent the space to organizers. The court also ruled that 
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One Piece does not glorify Japanese imperialism, perhaps the first legal opinion 
about the politics of any Japanese manga anywhere. (Asahi 2014)
4
  
Soon after the court ruling, Kim Seong Ho, a Korean reporter, pointed out why 
the flag flap was absurd,  
In Korea, it was one of the best-selling manga…. Later on, it was broadcast 
on KBS, where it also recorded the highest viewer ratings. In particular, the 
creator of One Piece, Oda Eichiro is known for his strong opposition to 
Japan’s imperialism and militarism, which has often caused controversy in 
Japan. (Kim 2014)
5
  
Sora Yang, a specialist in popular culture at Harvard University, believes that the 
controversy over One Piece demonstrates that, “pop culture is a good deal more 
revealing than we think it is.”6 She believes that the driving factor to cancel the 
show reflects, “not the power of public sentiment as it is, but the fear of what it 
might and could be.” Japan, as bogeyman, lives on. 
The delayed show finally premiered on July 26, 2014 and proved a big hit with 
Korean fans of Japanese pop culture that flocked to the exhibit whipping out 
smart-phones to take pictures of the life-size models of the characters on display. 
So in the end, this tempest in a teapot proved to be good PR with no protests and 
South Koreans embracing both the rule of law and Cool Japan. Alas, the two 
countries don’t have many of these happy endings to brag of. It’s worth pointing 
out that in May-June 2014 a blockbuster show by Japanese pop artist Kusama 
Yayoi, “A Dream I Dreamed”, further demonstrated that the complex politics of 
history, and the mutual vilification industry in both nation’s media and among 
netizens, are not always accurate barometers of grassroots sentiments.  
                                                 
4 The newest episode of One Piece serialized in Weekly Jump magazine during 2014 is set sometime 
in the 19th century, perhaps towards the end of the Tokugawa Era (1602–1858). There is a depiction 
of a Rising Sun-esque flag with the kanji for wa (harmonious) etched in the center. For Japanese this 
is an unmistakable reference to Japan, especially as there are samurai silhouettes in the foreground. 
The pirate protagonists refer to Wa as a closed country where the warriors are strong and hostile, 
making a raid difficult. Ōsawa speculates that perhaps some Koreans are concerned that One Piece 
might begin valorizing Japanese martial culture and values, but he discounts this possibility because 
unlike other popular manga, One Piece has consistently eschewed nationalism and patriotism and its 
main characters are stateless outlaws. 
5 Sora Yang, a researcher on popular culture at Harvard University provided the link and translation. 
6 Interview August 2014. 
Asian Studies II (XVIII), 2 (2014), pp.41–71 
 
47 
 
Constructing History 
History museums and memorials serve as repositories of selected memories that 
provide a window onto defining experiences of a nation. As such they reveal a 
nation’s soul, its anguish, its dreams and traumatic legacies. Problematically, they 
seek to, “combine the tasks of commemoration and of communicating history”, 
but usually do so incompletely. (Morris-Suzuki 2009) The nationalist narratives on 
display present a past for contemporary consumption, one that serves political 
purpose. (Denton 2014) The ghosts of the past that haunt these sites linger in the 
collective imagination, wraiths and apparitions that kindle shared remembrance 
and invoke powerful and primordial sentiments. These talismanic shrines to 
painful experiences and reminders of loss evoke nationalistic passions and 
promote unifying storylines. They are often sites of collective remembering of 
traumas endured, portals into the past that impart lessons and promote patriotism.  
Yoshida Takeshi, a historian at Western Michigan University and author of 
“From Cultures of War to Cultures of Peace” (2014), is concerned that the history 
museums may stoke bilateral tensions and make reconciliation more difficult 
because they suggest misleadingly monolithic views of denial among Japanese. In 
his view,  
Like their counter parts in China and Japan, elementary, junior high, and high 
school students visit these museums. While some don’t pay much attention to 
the exhibits, horrifying images of the atrocities may provoke 
nationalism/nationalistic sentiment among these young visitors. If the visitors 
in S. Korea know little about different Japanese viewpoints regarding Japan’s 
wartime past, they may simply conclude that militarism has surged in Japan. 
In South Korea, it is hard to overstate the power of the state to wield museums as 
cultural weapons to promote monolithic, collective memories aimed at ramping up 
nationalism and patriotic devotion. While South Korea accommodates discordant 
narratives on various issues, public discourse about Japanese colonial rule has not 
been challenged or undermined by competing interpretations and remains a 
historical space devoted to the alluring narrative of victimization and un-righted 
wrongs. By not taking the measure of its shared history with the Korean Peninsula, 
and tackling the onus of responsibility only episodically, evasively and 
ambiguously, Japan has handed the hammer of history to Koreans who have, 
naturally, wielded it with a vengeance. 
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In South Korea’s history museums, the shared past with Japan features an 
angry remembering with graphic depictions of suffered endured and atrocities 
inflicted, thus highlighting unresolved grievances that stoke the embers of 
resentment and hatred while nurturing a sense of shared degradation mixed with 
defiant patriotism. Museums and memorials about Japanese colonial rule explicitly 
nurture a national identity rooted in anti-Japanese nationalism, not only ensuring 
the odious past is not forgotten, but that it is also mobilized in the present to forge 
an unassailable common identity of stoic and heroic resistance, sacrifice for the 
nation and unity. Sophia University historian Sven Saaler argues,  
history is first of all mobilized to construct a South Korean national identity, 
in which Japan is one antipode, but not the only one. Some museums have a 
somewhat anti-Japanese focus, but overall the main point is to establish a 
(South) Korean identity. This is a very common phenomenon in modern 
nation-states and not particularity of Korea at all.
7
 
In history museums in China and Korea that focus on Japan, the Japanese 
depredations are richly and graphically detailed, leaving no doubt about the extent 
or nature of Japan’s heinous crimes. There is no shrinking from the cruelty and 
savagery of Japanese imperialism. Despite the similarities of history museums in 
the PRC and ROK, there does seem to be one striking difference. Chinese 
museums highlight the humiliations endured, sending a contemporary message on 
the need to be strong. (Denton 2014) South Korean museums don’t invoke 
humiliation, keeping the focus on the barbarity of Japanese colonial oppression 
and the steadfast, heroic resistance of Koreans. Of course, Chinese museums also 
feature heroic resistance in the face of Japanese barbarity. This insistence on the 
gruesome details seems designed to counter Japanese equivocations and 
disingenuous misrepresentations while stoking anti-Japanese animus. Hatch points 
out that Chinese museums express a more coherent narrative useful for promoting 
collective identity than do Japan’s war-related museums where competing 
valorizing and denunciatory narratives are on display. (Hatch 2014) 
According to Yoshida, “Chinese and South Korean peace museums tend to 
differ from their Japanese counterparts in that they often champion nationalism 
and ethnocentrism in a way similar to Japanese kamikaze and war museums.” 
(Yoshida 2014, 199) While he is right to argue that history museums in South 
Korea do not encourage reconciliation, it would seem that Japan bears some 
                                                 
7 Interview August 2014. 
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responsibility for the stridently accusatory displays precisely because it has not 
taken the measure of the nations’ shared history and thus not addressed the 
victim’s yearning for dignity. Japan has also avoided grand gestures of contrition 
and reconciliation that are the burden of the perpetrator; it is too much to ask the 
victim to meet halfway before the victimizer has resolutely and unambiguously 
accepted responsibility for its misdeeds. Japan has failed this test. Thus South 
Korean museums and memorials focus on reminding about what the Japanese 
perpetrated, erecting barriers to improved relations that will no doubt persist 
because no matter what Japan does it will probably never be enough, thereby 
ensuring that it will never try enough.  
Politics of History 
History haunts and inflames contemporary relations between Japan and South 
Korea. In an August 2010 speech commemorating the centennial of the Japanese 
annexation of the Korean Peninsula, then-Prime Minister Kan Naoto said:  
The Korean people of that time were deprived of their country and culture, 
and their ethnic pride was deeply scarred by the colonial rule that was 
imposed against their will. Those who render pain tend to forget it, while 
those who suffered cannot forget it easily. To the tremendous damage and 
sufferings that this colonial rule caused, I express here once again my feelings 
of deep remorse and my heartfelt apology. (Kingston 2011)  
This apology drew a sharp rebuke from current Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and 
right-wing groups that gathered outside the prime minister’s official residence in 
protest. 
In South Korea’s fractious society, ethno-nationalism is handy because there 
are few things that everyone can agree on with the exception of vilifying Japanese 
colonialism. As such, in democratic South Korea, politicians time and time again 
play the history card to boost inevitably sagging popularity because confronting 
Japan plays well in the theater of politics. And, as current President Park Geun-hye 
fully understands, being seen as soft or well disposed towards Japan is a major 
political liability that opponents don’t shy from exploiting for advantage. Her 
father, former President Park Chung-hee, is remembered for many things, but his 
pre-1945 military service in the Japanese Imperial Army and subsequent decisive 
role in normalizing relations with Japan in 1965 bestow an awkward legacy on Ms. 
Park, making it extremely difficult for her to insulate contemporary bilateral 
relations from unresolved historical grievances. (Han 2014) In this 1965 
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agreement, the South Korean government accepted $800 million in loans and 
grants in exchange for agreeing that all issues of compensation were settled, 
closing the door to individual redress with no apology. As such, this agreement has 
been a longstanding source of controversy in South Korea, a wound that was 
reopened in 2005 with the release of the archived documents related to the 
negotiations over the 1965 normalization accord. These documents revealed that 
the Japanese government had allocated funds for individual redress, but that most 
of it was diverted to infrastructure and industrialization projects at Park Chung-
hee’s behest.  
This duplicity rankled and provides context for the August 2010 ruling by the 
South Korean constitutional court that the government was violating the rights of 
Korean comfort women by not making efforts to press Japan for individual 
compensation. Then in a landmark decision in May 2011, the Korean Supreme 
Court ruled that the 1965 treaty normalizing relations with Japan does not 
invalidate claims by former forced laborers and their families for withheld wages. 
(Kingston 2013) These rulings forced the relatively pro-Japanese government of 
President Lee Myung-bak to become the unlikely champion for the victims of 
Japanese colonial rule and helps explain escalating tensions since then. (Dudden 
2012) Subsequently, in July 2013, Korean high courts in Seoul and Busan ruled in 
favor of plaintiffs seeking redress from the recently merged Nippon Steel & 
Sumitomo Metal Corp. and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The Seoul judge ruled 
that the companies committed “crimes against humanity” by working with the 
Japanese government to mobilize forced labor in support of a war of aggression 
and “illegal” colonial rule. (Kingston 2013) 
Despite this rancorous patch in bilateral relations, Tokyo and Seoul nearly 
finalized a deal on the comfort women, but it unraveled in December 2012. Under 
the terms of this agreement the Japanese Ambassador to South Korea would have 
visited the home of each surviving comfort woman and delivered a letter of 
apology from the prime minister in addition to monetary compensation. The hitch 
was whether Japan would accept legal responsibility for the colonial era abuses. 
The Japanese side was willing to accept moral responsibility in making this 
humanitarian gesture of atonement and reconciliation, but was adamant that it 
would not accept legal responsibility. Both sides suggest the other is to blame for 
the last minute failure, one that has sparked bitter recriminations and a sense of 
betrayal on both sides. Off the record, Japanese diplomats complain that the South 
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Korean government moved the goalposts at the last moment, requiring an 
admission of legal responsibility, when the deal was nearly finalized.
8
 Korean 
diplomats, also requesting anonymity, argue that a carefully calibrated agreement 
shirking legal responsibility falls short of the grand gesture required to restore 
dignity to the comfort women and the nation and therefore could not compromise 
on this point. Andrew Horvat, a specialist on regional reconciliation issues at Jōsai 
International University in Japan, believes that the South Korean move was 
deliberate and, “designed to scuttle the agreement by hard liners on the Korean 
side who have little to gain from an agreement and everything to lose since their 
only issue would be resolved.”9 Soon thereafter Prime Minister Abe Shinzo was 
elected to office, making a deal all but impossible given his apologist views 
regarding the comfort women system.  
Since President Park Geun-hye’s inauguration in February 2013 she has 
insisted that Japan’s PM Abe embrace a “correct view” of history before she 
would meet with him and upbraided a succession of US envoys sent to convince 
her to soften her stance. She reminded high ranking US officials, including 
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, that Germany’s reintegration into Europe 
would not have been possible if it acted like Japan in downplaying what it had 
done and shirking the burdens of history. Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine at the end 
of 2013 vindicated her criticism precisely because it is not just a religious space 
devoted to honoring the war dead. (Kingston 2007) The US government took 
Tokyo and Seoul by surprise when it issued a swift and sharp rebuke, expressing 
Washington’s view that Abe was impeding contemporary security cooperation in 
northeast Asia between its allies and gratuitously stoking regional tensions. Abe 
has further provoked Korean ire due to his revisionist views on history, especially 
the orchestrated attempts in 2014 by his party colleagues to discredit the 1993 
Kōno Statement in which Japan admitted state responsibility for the comfort 
women system, apologized for coercive recruitment and promised to atone. 
(Morris-Suzuki 2014) 
Finally, at the insistence of the US, more than a year after Park took office, she 
met Abe in the Netherlands in March 2014 on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security 
Summit. To pave the way for the meeting the US had prevailed on Abe to publicly 
declare that he would not overturn the 1993 Kōno Statement, a “just enough” 
                                                 
8 Interviews Tokyo 2013–2014. 
9 Interview August 2014. 
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gesture that fell well short of what Park means by “correct”, i.e. unequivocal 
acknowledgement of Japan’s burden of history on the Korean Peninsula. 
Unsurprisingly, this trilateral meeting of heads of state was a frosty gathering with 
minimal dialogue on the issues that divide.  
While South Korean public opinion polls support improvement in bilateral ties, 
and business leaders are especially keen to do so, it remains politically tricky 
between these “frenemies”. Due to the sharp shift in the region’s economic 
epicenter to China over the past decade, and South Korea’s burgeoning trade 
relations, there is growing concern about Beijing’s expanding influence 
reminiscent of the vassal state relations that prevailed until the 20
th
 century. In this 
context, maintaining good ties with the US and improving relations with Japan is 
seen to be a prudent hedging strategy. But Park’s paternal legacy leaves her 
vulnerable on Japan, and is a major factor in why she has taken such a hard line on 
history.  
Comfort Women Remembered and Internationalized 
Japanese reactionaries have been eager to turn the page on the shared past before it 
has been read, while South Koreans show no inclination to forgive or forget the 
traumas experienced at that time. No issue is as divisive as the “comfort women” 
system that involved Japanese military and government complicity in the coercive 
recruitment of tens of thousands of young women, mostly Koreans, to serve in 
military brothels. The Japanese Diet formed a committee in 2014 that conducted 
research and released findings aimed at discrediting the 1993 Kōono Statement by 
depicting it as a political compromise between the governments, a diplomatic olive 
branch and gesture of goodwill rather than a historically documented and accurate 
appraisal. It was due to the Kōno Statement that the government supported 
establishment of the Asia Women’s Fund (AWF), launched in 1995 and 
terminated in 2007. The AWF offered compensation and letters of apology signed 
by the prime minister, but because it was an equivocal gesture sidestepping the 
state’s legal responsibility, it did little to promote reconciliation. (Kingston 2010, 
198–205) 10  
Subsequently, a South Korean nongovernment organization commissioned a 
statue of an Asian girl barefoot in traditional dress, sitting next to an empty chair, 
                                                 
10 Perhaps the greatest legacy of the AWF is a digital museum about the comfort women system. It is 
available in Korean, Japanese and English.  
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her gaze fixed eerily in silent rebuke across the street on the Japanese Embassy in 
Seoul. The bronze statue was unveiled in December 2011 to mark the 1,000
th
 
weekly protest by a dwindling number of comfort women; only 55 remain alive as 
of mid-2014. Former President Lee Myung-bak (2008–13), South Korea’s most 
pro-Japanese leader since Park Chung-hee, grew so exasperated with Japanese 
intransigence over the comfort women and forced labor issues that he threatened 
to place additional statues on the site. 
 
Fig. 3: Comfort Woman statue in Seoul across from Japanese Embassy 
The internationalization of the comfort women controversy has simmered in 
UN human rights committees and in dueling op-eds around the world, but now 
there are overseas efforts to create tangible memorials that commemorate the 
women’s suffering and cause considerable discomfort among Japanese 
government officials and conservatives. Since 2010, four towns in the U.S. have 
unveiled comfort women monuments that have drawn angry protests by 
conservative Japanese politicians.  
The comfort women monument movement in the US is directly linked to PM 
Abe’s 2007 comments quibbling about the level of coercion involved in recruiting 
Korean women. There is a perception in the US, driven by 21
st
 century human 
rights and gender equality norms and values, that too many Japanese politicians 
are in denial about the comfort women system and demonstrate insufficient 
contrition. In response, Korean-American groups have played a role in lobbying 
and fundraising to commemorate the suffering of comfort women. In 2010 
Palisades Park, New Jersey where more than half of the population is Korean 
American, became the first municipality to erect a comfort women memorial 
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despite intense lobbying by Japanese diplomats not to do so. There is also a 
comfort women memorial in Nassau County, New York at the Veterans’ 
Memorial in Eisenhower Park.  
On 2013 Glendale, California unveiled a statue identical to that in Seoul that is 
placed in the town’s public park. (Levine 2014) It did so on July 30, the day the 
town council has designated Comfort Women Day. A Japanese-American woman 
resident in Glendale together with a Los Angeles based nonprofit group that 
campaigns against the comfort women redress movement, sued the town of 
Glendale in California. The lawsuit filed in the US District Court in Los Angeles 
argued that the town of Glendale, by erecting the statue, infringed on the federal 
government’s right to conduct foreign affairs and demanded that it be removed. 
The plaintiffs also argued that the Japanese government was not involved in sexual 
slavery, claiming that, “by installing the public monument, Glendale has taken a 
position in the contentious and politically sensitive international debate concerning 
the proper historical truth of the former comfort women.” Although the Glendale 
council approved installation of the statue, the lawsuit alleges that the text of a 
plaque adjacent to the monument regarding the history of comfort women was not 
reviewed and approved in violation of the city’s code. The plaque dedicates the 
monument to the memory of 200,000 comfort women from all over Asia while 
imploring the Japanese government to accept responsibility for its role in the 
system. The plaque also explains that the adjacent empty chair, “symbolizes 
comfort women survivors who are dying of old age without having yet witnessed 
justice.” (Johnston 2014)  
In August 4, 2014 the judge dismissed the lawsuit and the plaintiffs’ demand 
to remove the comfort women statue. The judge also confirmed that, “the statue is 
entirely consistent with the federal government’s foreign policy.” That same day 
the town of Union City, New Jersey became the fourth in the US to establish a 
comfort women memorial. 
Sven Saaler, professor of Japanese history at Sophia, doesn’t think that the 
new memorials represent a significant change because,  
The issues at stake are the same. Building memorials is just an attempt to set 
something in stone, quite literally. Previously, appeals to the international 
community were made through criticizing textbook contents or visits of 
politicians in Japan to certain memorials. Now memorials are built in order to 
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appeal to the international community, but the original intent and the issues at 
stake have not really changed.
11
 
Yoshida, professor of history at Western Michigan University, comments, 
Politics, power, economy, justice, and national identity are probably the 
reasons behind the internationalization of Japan’s wartime atrocities. To many 
Americans, forcing women into sexual slavery is a violation of human rights, 
and it is no surprise that many of them support building the memorials 
dedicated to these women. Many Americans are probably unaware of 
violations of women’s rights around the US bases in the world, though. The 
PRC and the South Korean government seem to have been using the past to 
unite the nation, too.
12
 
While Japanese conservatives allege that Korean-American groups are 
orchestrating this anti-Japan campaign, Mindy Kotler, director of the Washington 
D.C.-based Asia Policy Point, comments,  
Koreans are coming of age politically in the U.S. They are practicing “retail 
politics” as every ethnic group in the U.S. has. They are not doing anything 
different than the Irish, the Armenians, the Jews, or the Greeks. It’s a Japanese 
worldview that sees this as an effort to embarrass Japan. It is not viewed that 
way here, only as standing up for your heritage. (Johnston 2014) 
Following a brief visit to Tokyo in April 2014, President Barack Obama visited 
Seoul where he condemned Japan’s “comfort women” system as  
a terrible, egregious violation of human rights. Those women were violated in 
ways that, even in the midst of war, was shocking. And they deserve to be 
heard; they deserve to be respected; and there should be an accurate and clear 
account of what happened. I think Prime Minister Abe recognizes, and 
certainly the Japanese people recognize, that the past is something that has to 
be recognized honestly and fairly. (White House 2014)  
It is interesting that Obama only “thinks” Abe gets it, implying he may not, while 
he knows the Japanese people understand the moral demands of historical 
responsibility. Clearly, Abe remains behind the eight ball of revisionist history in 
part because he has eroded trilateral trust between Washington, Seoul and Tokyo 
and not made any gestures that address this pain or the victims’ search for justice 
and dignity. (Togo 2014) Indeed, in August 2014 Navi Pillay, the outgoing United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, lamented that Japan, “has failed to 
                                                 
11 Interview August 2014. 
12 Interview August 2014. 
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pursue a comprehensive, impartial and lasting resolution” to the comfort women 
issue and was critical of the 2014 Diet inquiry by conservative lawmakers intent 
on debunking the 1993 Kōno Statement. (Pillay 2014) 
As Alexis Dudden, professor of history at the University of Connecticut 
observes,  
In the internationalization of history, the story of the sex slaves has resonated 
most and rightly so. This is why Japan now finds itself again receiving 
censure from the UN Human Rights Commission: just what doesn’t Abe “get” 
about the term “slavery”? For the Japanese government, this is not just a 
losing story, but beneath the nation’s dignity. It’s also why the surviving 
Korean sex slaves’ decision to use any money gained in the future for an 
international fund––they set it up 2 years ago––is telling: the victims teach the 
rest of us that truly awful histories are by definition international once they 
are learned as history.
13
 
Ahn Jung-geun: Awkward Avatar of Anti-Japanese Nationalism 
To defend the Orient one must improve (or change) one’s strategy. The time to 
act is now, otherwise all will be lost.  
欲保東洋 先改政略 時過失機追悔何及 14 
Japan is worried that China and South Korea are ganging up on it over history, 
pointing to the memorial hall unveiled at Harbin Station in north-eastern China 
earlier this year honoring Ahn Jung-geun, the South Korean independence activist 
who in October 1909 assassinated Itō Hirobumi, a prominent Japanese statesman 
closely associated with Japan’s annexation of the peninsula. (Rausch 2013) This 
memorial was suggested by Park in the summer of 2013 and taken up by Chinese 
President Xi Jinping, attesting to warming bilateral relations at the expense of 
Japan. 
Historian Sven Saaler points out that,  
statues to independence fighters that were active in a transnational setting are 
nothing unusual, so the Japanese claim that the building of this memorial was 
a one-sided interpretation of history is not only incorrect, it is also 
inappropriate and hypocritical given the extremely one-sided interpretations 
                                                 
13 Interview August 2014. 
14Ahn Jung-geun Memorial Hall website, translations by Yun Hyun Sook.  
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of East Asian history advocated by members of the current [Abe] 
administration.
15
 
“We recognize Ahn Jung-geun as a terrorist who was sentenced to death for killing 
our country’s first prime minister,” said Suga Yoshihide, Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzo’s chief Cabinet spokesman in January 2014. 
In reply to Suga, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang stated: “Ahn 
Jung-geun is, in history, an upholder of justice who fought against Japan’s 
aggression. If Ahn Jung-geun was a terrorist, what about the 14 Class-A war 
criminals of World War II honored in Yasukuni Shrine?” For Koreans this 
“terrorist” is a national hero and patriotic martyr who gave his life for his nation, a 
narrative of dying honorably, a model of ultimate sacrifice to inspire contemporary 
Koreans. 
In a triumph of chutzpah over history, Ahn’s legacy has been repositioned in 
light of contemporary political and diplomatic battles. (Denney and Green 2014) 
Although he was a passionate advocate of Pan Asianism under Japanese 
leadership––a form of collective self-defense against western imperialism––he has 
been transformed for contemporary purposes into an exemplar of anti-Japanese 
nationalism. In this narrative, his act of assassination takes center stage while his 
Pan Asian writing and advocacy of regional unity and cooperation are 
marginalized. 
In the heart of Seoul, Ahn has long been honored as a national martyr and hero 
with a far more extensive memorial hall than that in Harbin. Tōgō Kazuhiko, 
former Japanese ambassador to the Netherlands and grandson of wartime Foreign 
Minister Tōgō Shigenori (one of the Class-A war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni 
Shrine), once told me that he abhorred the assassination, but grew to admire Ahn 
upon learning about his Pan-Asiatic views at this museum. Ahn wanted to forge a 
united response among Asians to Western imperialism and viewed Japanese 
colonialism as a betrayal. He held Itō Hirobumi personally responsible for this 
treachery because he drew up the 1905 Eulsa Treaty that made Korea a 
protectorate of Japan with the acquiescence of the western powers following 
Japan’s victory over Russia. (Dudden 2005) Subsequently, Japan engaged in a 
devastating scorched earth policy to subdue resistance that led to annexation in 
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1910. Ahn was executed on March 26, 1910 before completing his “A Treatise on 
Peace in the East”, a call for regional solidarity to resist western imperialism. 
 
Fig. 4: Ahn Jung-geun Memorial Hall 
To commemorate the centennial of Japanese colonization, the sleek new Ahn 
Jung-geun Memorial Hall on the hillside of Namsan Park in central Seoul re-
opened in 2010, replacing the museum built there in 1970. This iteration is 
designer chic, a series of twelve translucent cubes edged by a shallow moat nestled 
in a grove of trees. The dozen cubes symbolize the number of unsung heroes who 
participated in Ahn’s Society of Patriots. As Ahn was Catholic, it is striking that 
the number corresponds to the number of apostles.  
The entrance is a downward sloping ramp flanked on the right by a wall etched 
with Ahn’s calligraphic messages and handprints, all missing his ring finger that 
was cut off to provide blood as a substitute for ink when inscribing a flag with the 
characters for “Korean Independence”. These messages were originally written 
while Ahn was imprisoned after being arrested for the assassination. They include 
quotes on morality and loyalty from the Confucian Analects and other Chinese 
classics and as such constitute cultural weapons, a way for Ahn to continue his 
struggle and convey his message even while incarcerated. (Wakabayashi 2008) 
They are signed––Ahn Jung-geun “Citizen of Great Korea”. Some were written 
for a Japanese prosecutor (“Seriously worrying and thinking about the safety and 
crisis of the country” (“國家安危労心焦思 ”) and a Japanese guard (“The 
devotion to the country is the serviceman’s duty” (“為國獻身軍人本分”) that 
were returned to the South Korean government by the families of the original 
recipients. Ahn seemed to win the grudging respect of Japanese officials during 
the five month imprisonment before his execution because of his dignity and 
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religious piety, a remarkable turn of events given that he had killed one of Japan’s 
national heroes. One of Ahn’s own poems on display reads: “Every year the same 
flowers bloom, but the people change with the passing of time” (年々歳歳花相以、
歳歳年々人不同). 
 
Fig. 5: Ahn’s distinctive handprints and calligraphy adjacent to entrance ramp 
 
Spread over three floors, the exhibits honor Ahn as a “patriotic martyr” and are 
brimming with nationalistic symbols, none more compelling than the massive 
Korean flag hanging behind Ahn’s statue in the spacious gallery close to the 
entrance, one that is festooned with his bloody calligraphy spelling out “Korean 
Independence”. There is a dramatized reenactment of the assassination and 
subsequent courtroom scene, the pistol used in the shooting, a replica of his 
severed ring finger and even an Ahn anime room. The museum highlights Ahn’s 
background and participation in the pro-independence movement against Japan as 
his Pan Asian thoughts are overshadowed by displays devoted to his patriotic 
activism and the assassination.  
 
Fig. 6: Korean flag with Ahn’s bloody calligraphy declaring independence 
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Interestingly, the museum is located on the site of Chōsen Jinguū, the Shinto 
shrine built by the Japanese in 1925 and dedicated to Emperor Meiji and 
Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess of Japanese mythology. It was demolished after 
independence in October 1945 because it symbolized Japanese cultural 
imperialism and efforts at Japanization. (Han 2014) From 1925 Korean elementary 
and middle school students were required to attend Shinto Shrines (there were 
1,140 scattered over the peninsula as of 1945) where the Japanese Emperor was 
venerated, and from 1935 such attendance was also compulsory for university 
students and government employees. (Wakabayashi 2008) This spiritual space 
once devoted to imperial veneration is now re-consecrated as a locus of colonial 
condemnation. 
Denney and Green (2014) argue,  
While Koreans and Chinese remember Ahn as a heroic independence activist, 
many Japanese will continue to see him as a terrorist, pure and simple. And 
while South Korea has by and large moved beyond the fissures of its 
contentious past, the divisive history of figures like Ahn are a stark reminder 
that legacy politics in the region continues to fan the flames of conflict, and 
seems set to do so for many years to come. 
Ahn is heavily politicized and frequently instrumentalized to justify and bolster an 
anti-Japanese sentiment that he did not share. Franklin Rausch argues that,  
a survey of An’s writings and his interrogation and trial transcripts turns up 
little that is anti-Japanese in this broad sense. In fact, An invariably referred 
politely to the Japanese Emperor and avoided criticism of the Japanese people 
and government as a whole. (Rausch 2013) 
Donald Keene, who wrote a biography of Emperor Meiji, asserts that,  
An was not anti-Japanese. The man he most admired was undoubtedly 
Emperor Meiji, and one of his most vehement accusations against Ito 
Hirobumi was that he had intentionally deceived the emperor, who desired not 
the subjugation of Korea but peace in East Asia and Korea independence. An 
was delighted to read about Japanese victories over the Russians and claimed 
that his compatriots shared his joy over the defeats suffered by one of the 
agents of White Peril. He regretted only that Japan had broken off the war 
before Russia was reduced to total submission. (Keene 2002, 664)  
Killing Itō was about exposing his lies in the hope this would lead the Meiji 
Emperor to reform Japan’s policies in Korea. The self-styled “righteous soldier” 
fighting the “righteous war” erred in thinking that his death would spark a rational 
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reconsideration of Japan’s colonial project in Korea. Little could he imagine that 
he would subsequently be drafted to serve as patron saint for “righteous” anti-
Japanese agitation in the 21
st
 century. 
Keene notes,  
An still hoped that relations between the two countries would become closer, 
providing a model for the whole world to imitate. An urged a sympathetic 
Japanese prosecutor not to worry about whether or not he would be 
condemned to death. (Keene 2002, 664)  
Rather than being virulently anti-Japanese, Ahn proposed a loose confederation 
between China, Korea and Japan, a Pan Asian vision advocating trilateral 
cooperation and autonomy. Ahn expected Japan to take the lead since it was the 
most advanced of the three nations and could promote successful modernization in 
East Asia. But this is not the Ahn the contemporary state needs so his shooting Itō 
to death is highlighted at the expense of his desire for Pan Asian cooperation.  
History Imprisoned and Unshackled 
The seven red-brick buildings of the Seodaemun Prison History Hall look more 
like an old factory complex than an infamous colonial-era prison where the 
Japanese government in Chōsen (the colonial name for Korea) incarcerated and 
tortured anti-colonial activists and political agitators.  
The prison facility now serves as a museum featuring dark cramped cells, 
replete with scenes of torture and canned screams of pain.
16
 One sign proclaims: 
“Torture-A Tool for Ruling the Colony”. We learn that water and fingernail torture, 
and savage beatings, were common practice in the underground torture chamber 
where prisoners were interrogated. To intimidate them, they were kept waiting 
their turn in an adjacent “temporary detention room” so they could hear the sounds 
of torture and moans of pain, and anticipate what lay in store.  
It is an unnerving space of cruelty, a crypt for the hidden horrors of the 
colonial past. The wooden isolation cells resemble standing coffins that visitors 
can step inside to experience the claustrophobic experience as a companion 
secures the door. Perhaps the most riveting feature of the facility is the possibility 
of having one’s picture taken and digitally inserted onto the face of a prisoner 
undergoing torture. There is also a table where one can sit hooded wearing a 
                                                 
16 I visited in 2009 before extensive renovations and again in 2014.  
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wicker basket, arms extended and manacled at the wrists, reenacting how the 
fingernail torture was administered.  
 
Fig. 7: Fingernail torture 
Seodaemun was the largest of sixteen prisons built throughout the peninsula in 
1908, “with the aim of suppressing the Korean patriots who were fighting to 
regain national sovereignty.” Renovated in 2010 for the centennial, the 
Seodaemun exhibits now convey more about the colonial era history, explaining 
for example that the space of the facility was expanded thirty-fold in the 1930s to 
accommodate the increased number of Korean independence activists. Established 
with a capacity for 500 prisoners, by the end of the colonial era Seodaemun 
housed 23,532. At that time there were 261 warders, Korean employees referred to 
as “faithful first-line puppets”; before the 2010 renovation the delicate topic of 
colonial collaborators was not raised. The museum explains that on average there 
were, “30 or so prisons in each city, making the country like a huge prison.”  
 
Fig. 8: Seodaemun Prison 
Unlike in China, there is no dwelling on national humiliation. In the National 
Resistance Hall of the museum visitors learn, “the Korean people were never 
frustrated about the annexation but actively launched independence movements.” 
It is a story of brave and unrelenting resistance by staunch patriots despite Japan’s, 
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“harsh colonial rule, making Koreans fall into a state of slavery and frantically 
trying to liquidate Korean culture and language.” It was an “incessant struggle” in 
which “the whole of Korea” participated, except for the many collaborators. A 
display about the “heroic struggle” notes that activists targeted Japanese and pro-
Japanese Koreans, complicating the valorous narrative with collaboration.  
 
Fig. 9: Cell-block where post-independence, pro-democracy political prisoners were 
held 
Although unacknowledged in the museum’s pamphlet, the museum has 
tackled the controversial use of the jail to incarcerate a new generation of 
dissidents by South Korea’s military regimes from the 1960s–1980s, thereby 
linking the pro-independence and pro-democracy struggles as well as the Japanese 
colonial and ROK military regimes. There are several cells on one corridor with 
displays featuring the stories of these post-independence political prisoners 
although after the 2010 renovations one can no longer see the messages these 
prisoners scratched onto the walls. One plaque explains that the prison was 
operated until 1987, where, “many democratization activists during the despotic 
regime after liberation were imprisoned, tortured and died.”  
 
Fig. 10: Cell-block with dioramas about ROK political prisoners 
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So the post-2010 version of Seodaemun embraces a more controversial history, 
complicating what had been a straightforward prosecution of the Japanese by 
implicating Koreans in collaborating with the colonial regime as warders and 
therefore part of the colonial system of subjugation. Moreover, the museum now 
tells the previously untold story of the prison’s role in the suppression of the pro-
democracy movement, a place where political prisoners opposing a succession of 
Korean authoritarian regimes were jailed, tortured and killed. In that sense 
Seodaemun has become a powerful symbol of resistance against the 20
th
 century 
arc of tyranny that engulfed the peninsula, connecting colonial and independent 
Korea, underscoring the painful evolution from an oppressed nation to its 
democratic flowering since the denouement of military rule at the end of the 1980s. 
The indictment of the ROK military, forced now into the dock alongside the 
nefarious Japanese, is a bold statement signaling just how far democracy has come. 
But, the pain persists because like the Japanese, South Korea’s military henchmen 
have not been held sufficiently accountable and won’t be.  
Resilient History Wars  
Nearly seventy years after the end of Japanese colonial rule on the Korean 
peninsula in 1945 the legacies continue to reverberate angrily within both 
countries and between them. Prospects for reconciliation between these frenemies 
seem remote because on too many issues concerning the shared past there is little 
common ground between what Koreans insist on and what conservative Japanese 
are prepared to acknowledge. The failure of the AWF (Asian Women’s Fund) to 
heal wounds and the last minute collapse of a deal on the comfort women at the 
end of 2012 represent missed opportunities. Paradoxically, these reconciliation 
initiatives provoked considerable bitterness, leaving scar tissue on both sides. 
Clearly the onus of history is on Japan to address the maimed dignity of its Korean 
victims, but reconciliation initiatives also require Koreans to enable Japan to 
regain dignity; otherwise there is insufficient incentive to proceed.  
For many Japanese the history wars are about humiliating Japan and this has 
sparked an anti-Korean backlash. The Japanese media has cashed in on (and fueled) 
the “anti-Korea” (kenkan) boom, churning out hate mongering stories in the 
weekly magazines. (Schreiber 2013) Nationalist anti-Korean manga are also quite 
popular. (Sakamoto and Allen 2007) This media frenzy has also spilled over into 
street protests by racist/anti-immigrant groups such as the rightwing Zaitokukai 
that harass ethnic Koreans, calling on them to leave Japan and threatening to kill 
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them if they don’t. (Dudden 2010) Korean schools have also endured hate speech 
barrages by such xenophobic Japanese groups, although the courts have levied 
fines and issued injunctions. The vast majority of Japanese repudiate this 
harassment and there have been larger counter demonstrations, but contemporary 
Japan, viewed from South Korea, can appear ominous, especially given that PM 
Abe espouses jingoistic views and is closely associated with the distortions and 
misrepresentations of revisionist history. He also appointed like-minded cronies to 
the board of NHK, Japan’s quasi-state broadcaster. Momii Katsuto, Abe’s 
handpicked chairman of NHK, downplayed the comfort women issue at his first 
news conference in January 2014, suggesting that South Korea was always “raking 
over old ashes” in asserting demands for further compensation.  
Viewed from South Korea, this looks like the same old story of denial and 
downplaying, a narrative that stokes anti-Japanese nationalism. Korean museums, 
as we have seen with the One Piece manga brouhaha, are sites of these history 
wars and also serve as repositories for various unresolved grievances and the 
mobilization of the painful past to whack Japan, thus inciting rage and indignation 
in both nations. This cycle of mutual recriminations over shared history is not 
unique or inevitable, but has proven remarkably resilient. Korea’s history 
museums confront the logic of reconciliation with narratives that reduce history to 
a zero sum game, edifices of memory that reject reconciliation. As such they are 
tangible symbols of reproach to those who seek to free the present from the 
dungeon of the past.  
Problematically, both the Japanese and Koreans have good reason to cling to 
their mutual recriminations and vilification because it stokes a useful nationalism. 
In Japan, Abe fans nationalistic sentiments to promote his patriotic agenda while 
South Korea seeks to keep Japan wriggling on the hook of history. For Seoul and 
Tokyo, thus, the upside of reconciliation appears limited. 
Many Japanese are exasperated by the history wars because in the seven 
decades since defeat, Japan has been a force for peace and prosperity in Asia. 
While this positive record counts for little in South Korea, it is not only jingoistic 
Japanese who feel that Japan’s positive contributions and relatively exemplary 
record should earn it some kudos rather than what has become ritualized 
vilification. Japanese may indeed feel perpetrator’s fatigue, tired of being blamed 
for pre-1945 events, but this is not a compelling argument for ignoring a tragic 
past that remains poorly understood by many Japanese. Japan is certainly not alone 
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in wishing away its historical burdens or banishing them to the margins of 
mainstream narratives. Indeed the Germans are remarkable for not averting their 
collective gaze from the worst their nation was capable of while the Japanese stand 
with much of Europe and the U.S. in shirking responsibility and falling short on 
gestures of atonement and reconciliation.  
The sense of being victimized by its history of victimizing is nonetheless 
extraordinary among conservative Japanese. From their perspective, Koreans are 
playing the history card to wheedle concessions and compensation from Japan. In 
this kaleidoscopic view of history, what Japan did then pales in significance 
relative to what it is being asked to do now. Naturally, Koreans don’t see it this 
way and remain insistent about reminding Japan about past horrors because it 
seems too eager to move on. Saaler explains, “The manipulation of history for 
nation-building purposes is, of course, not unique to South Korea; it is what every 
nation does and is what modern nationhood and nationalism are rooted in…state-
sanctioned myth-making.”17 
Overall, in Japanese museums, textbooks and popular narratives, what was 
endured overshadows what was inflicted during the 1895–1945 period of Japanese 
imperialism. (Dower 2012)
18
 It’s not that this suffering cancels the debts, or 
creates a reassuring moral equivalency, but rather the collective gaze is drawn 
inward and eyes are averted from the colossal crimes of Japanese imperial 
expansion. Instead, Pan Asianism is invoked to reassure that whatever happened 
overseas was done with good intentions, driven by the noble mission of liberating 
Asia from the yoke of western imperialism. Some Japanese also esteem 
colonialism in Korea as a hothouse of modernization and progress, but this 
exculpatory narrative is a dead-end, one that infuriates Koreans and inflames the 
history wars.  
Rethinking Museums 
What role can museums play in engaging and shaping public discourse and 
attitudes towards the shared past? South Korea’s history museums remain trapped 
in angry and accusatory narratives that allow for little nuance, commemorating 
colonial suffering and conveying a grim history of relentless Japanese 
depredations. It’s a tale that needs telling and retelling because the Japanese have 
                                                 
17 Interview Aug. 2014. 
18 Hatch (2014) reminds us that there are significant exceptions to this generalization. 
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not been listening and have not done enough to confront the ghosts of the past. 
And so this past is endlessly excavated and mobilized. The evolution of the 
Seodaemun demonstrates, however, that there are possibilities of complicating 
narratives, making new connections and reexamining nationalist discourses.  
Andrew Horvat who reported on South Korea from the 1970s as a journalist 
and worked as the Director of the Asia Foundation’s reconciliation programs in 
the early 2000s, is somewhat optimistic that eventually the story of extensive 
Korean collaboration that currently stirs righteous moral condemnation will shift 
towards acceptance or at least a greater degree of toleration. He argues that,  
anti-Japanese nationalism in Korea is so all-pervasive, so fierce and so 
universal because without it Koreans would have to confront the unacceptable 
reality of collaboration. This collaboration should not be seen in moralistic 
terms, but it is now. The fact is that Japan was the only game in town for 
Koreans, especially those like President Park’s father, who were ambitious 
and wanted to get ahead. You either accepted Japanese rule, and used it to get 
ahead, or you stayed on the farm and ate barley. 
As of 2014 the “barley eaters” narrative still appears to be in the ascendant as the 
politics of history portrays this choice as one between unalloyed Good and Evil, 
making it hard to imagine how collaboration can be decoupled from morality and 
repositioned as a practical (and widespread) accommodation to prevailing colonial 
realities. 
Collaboration remains a dark space in Korean history because many of those 
who have exercised political and economic power in post-WWII South Korea 
were catapulted into the elite by their colonial-era experiences, and skills and 
networks developed under Japanese rule. This reality gnaws at the sanctimonious 
national identity that prevails. Yet “decriminalizing” collaboration might be a 
useful step towards reconciliation because it would open up new possibilities for 
collaborative research and museum exhibits featuring reconsideration of the shared 
history, drawing on intriguing progress in the realm of transnational colonial 
literature. (Kleeman 2003) 
Morris-Suzuki (2009) suggests the possibilities of mingling national narratives, 
creating virtual spaces where,  
…different narratives [can] be brought into contact with one another… 
allowing the light of [each] national narrative to illuminate the darkness of the 
others, and enabling the perspectives of the many victims …to emerge from 
the shadows. 
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It is an intriguing idea, but disseminating it may prove difficult.  
For example, there is a digital museum about the comfort women that was 
compiled by the Asia Women’s Fund and is translated into Korean, Japanese and 
English. (AWF 2007, Wada 2008) This virtual library upends the misleading 
narrative of Japan’s collective amnesia, conveying important information about 
one of the festering wounds in bilateral relations. It contains reference materials, 
voices of some of the victims collected in an oral history project, memoirs of 
Korean comfort women, five volumes of documents collected by a government 
investigation and some videos. In short, it is an invaluable resource for teachers, 
researchers and journalists. But the AWF never got traction in South Korea and 
activists groups there discouraged former comfort women from accepting the 
proffered compensation because it was seen to be a Japanese government 
subterfuge to avoid taking direct legal responsibility and thus shirking the burdens 
of history. (Soh 2008) In the absence of rebranding, getting Koreans into the door 
of this museum may prove difficult. 
My pessimistic conclusion is that the time is not ripe for reconciliation in 
museums, textbooks or other spaces for narratives of Korean-Japanese history and 
won’t be for the foreseeable future. Much as mutual understanding is an alluring 
goal, and efforts towards this should be maintained, the pathologies of the past 
won’t be overcome in the absence of sufficient government will to do so; here the 
signs are not encouraging. In South Korean democracy, there is very little room 
for compromise on colonial history and an irresistible temptation to score points 
for political gain at the expense of reconciliation. Japanese government officials 
and conservative politicians feel that sincere efforts such as the Kono Statement 
and AWF have been sabotaged and dismissed, and that their counterparts will 
never be satisfied, leaving them disinclined to pursue further reconciliation 
initiatives. It is unlikely that resilient grassroots ties can achieve what museums 
have not, because even as people in Japan and South Korea enthusiastically 
consume each other’s popular cultures, visit each other’s tourist sites and interact 
far more than before through various educational, cultural and civil society 
exchanges, the venomous backlash in both countries in recent years suggests that 
unshackling the present from the past remains a long-term project.  
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